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A New Export Policy: The Foreign
Sales Corporation and State Unitary
Taxation of Foreign Source Income
Reed D. Rubinstein*
The economic health of the United States (U.S.) could be improved through
the implementation of a new export policy. To be effective, such a policy should
simultaneously encourage the continued expansion of the export production sec-
tor of the economy' and discourage direct foreign investment by U.S. corpora-
tions. 2 Reductions in the size of the difference between pre-tax and after-tax
return on export activity represent an attractive vehicle for implementing the new
policy because such reductions will spur corporate investment and production in
export industries without necessitating undesirable federal intervention in the
basic production and marketing processes. 3 Two tax programs are especially
* Reed D. Rubinstein is a member of the class of 1985, University of Michigan Law School.
1. The period since 1970 has been one of massive growth for the export sector of the economy. In
1972, goods manufactured for export constituted 4.8 percent of the total value of U.S. manufactures
and 770,000 workers were directly employed in the production of export goods. By 1980, exports
constituted 8.3 percent of the total value of U.S. manufactures and 1.5 million workers were em-
ployed in export production. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 780 (1982-83) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
These figures become even more impressive in light of the fact that the general unemployment rate for
the same period increased nearly 40 percent, moving from 4.7 percent to 7.1 percent. Id. at 375.
Given the present state of the economy, such export production growth is sorely needed. Accord-
ing to the Commerce Department, in the second quarter of 1983, manufacturers were operating at
only 73.3 percent of their productive capacity, which constitutes roughly 78 percent of optimum
utilization. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 63 SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS 21 table 3 (Sept. 1983). Meanwhile, unemployment for all adults age 16 and older stood at
8.2 percent. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 6
at A-I (Dec. 1983). The evidence indicates that the export production sector of the economy could
help significantly in improving those figures.
2. Direct foreign investment by U.S. corporations has increased from $145,990 million in 1977 to
$227,343 million in 1982. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 63 SURVEY
OF CURRENT BUSINESS 22 table 10 (Aug. 1983). Although it is difficult to estimate the number of jobs
or the amount of tax revenue that would have been produced if business had invested those dollars in
the domestic economy, there can be no doubt that the figures would be substantial.
3. Arthur B. Laffer, an economist at the University of Southern California, states that "[tihe
decision whether or not to work or invest depends upon aftertax income." Thus, changes in the tax
code that affect rates of return on specific investments will necessarily change the behavior of
business decision-makers. See How Tax Policy Dampens Economic Growth, Bus. Wk., Apr. 24,
1978, at 61.
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well-suited to promote the goals of the new export policy. The proposed Foreign
Sales Corporation (FSC) 4 would be an effective export incentive and the unitary
system of taxation offers great promise as a practical disincentive to direct for-
eign investment.
Part I of this note will examine the structure of the FSC, and analyze its
potential benefits in light of the Domestic International Sales Corporation
(DISC)5 tax incentive. Part II discusses the use of the unitary tax as a disincentive
to direct foreign investment by U.S. corporations. Finally, Part III outlines the
new export policy based upon a combination of the FSC export incentive and
state unitary taxation of foreign-source income. If implemented, this policy
would increase export production and discourage direct foreign investment,
thereby making a substantial contribution to U.S. economic well-being.
I. THE FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION
The Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) is a proposal to use tax incentives to
improve the competitive position of American goods in foreign markets 6 and to
encourage business investment in the U.S. economy while meeting U.S. obliga-
tions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The FSC is a descendent
of the current federal export tax incentive, the Domestic International Sales
Corporation (DISC). 7 Like the DISC, the FSC seeks to enhance the profitability
of export production by reducing taxes on profits earned through exporting.'
4. See The Foreign Sales Corporation Act of 1983, H.R. 3810, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. [hereinafter
referred to as Foreign Sales Corporation Act of 19831.
5. I.R.C. §§ 991-997 (1971).
6. It is generally understood that other Western nations subsidize their exports more than the U.S.
does. According to one study, "When actual foreign practices are drawn into the light, it is evident
that every country, in one fashion or another, encourages exports by means of the structure and
application of its tax laws . . . to a greater degree than the U.S." Tax Incentives and Small Business
Exports: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Tax, Access to Equity Capital and Business Opportunities
of the House Comm. on Small Business, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 278 (1982) (report on "Foreign Tax
Practices Affecting Exports," submitted by Charles M. Bruce, Attorney, Cole & Corette) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings, Tax Incentives].
7. See supra note 5.
8. The DISC operated on the basis of special rules that allowed exporters to protect far more
income than would be allowed by the traditional tax regulations. Those intercompany pricing rules
permit a DISC to realize taxable income in an amount.which does not exceed the greater of:
(a) Four percent of the qualified export receipts attributable to the sale of export property
plus ten percent of related export promotion expenses, which are defined as the ordinary and
necessary expenses incurred to obtain qualified export receipts;
(b) 50 percent of the combined taxable income of the DISC and its related suppliers
attributable to qualified export receipts plus ten percent of related export promotion expenses
.. . [and only the marginal or variable production and sales costs for the export property need
be included in the computation of taxable income]; or
(c) taxable income based upon the price actually charged the DISC by its related suppliers
if that price is justifiable under the [I.R.C.] section 482 transfer pricing regulations.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE OPERATION AND EFFECT OF THE DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SALES
CORPORATION LEGISLATION, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1983) [hereinafter cited as OPERATION AND
EFFECT]. The FSC adopts the theoretical approach of the DISC, but is structured somewhat differ-
ently. For a review of the tax reduction mechanism used in the FSC, see infra note 68.
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A. The Disc as a Paradigm for Export Tax Incentives.
The DISC program provides many valuable lessons for U.S. policy planners in
using the tax code to stimulate a specific sector of the economy. Because the
DISC has been a source of considerable friction between the U.S. and its Euro-
pean trading partners,9 the Reagan Administration has asked Congress to repeal
this incentive. Nonetheless, in terms of its basic structure and its effect, the DISC
is a useful paradigm.
1. The Structure of the DISC.
The Nixon Administration proposed the DISC in 1972 in order to give U.S.
exporters, especially small businesses, a counter-weight to the advantages for-
eign producers enjoyed through subsidies and other concessions provided by
their governments. 10 The Adminstration also intended that the DISC provide
small businesses with an incentive comparable to the tax benefits that the large
multinationals could acquire through the use of foreign subsidiaries." The DISC
program, designed to expand U.S. export activity by reducing the cost of export
capital, encouraged U.S.-based corporations to reach foreign markets through
exporting rather than through direct foreign investment or joint ventures. ' 2 It was
hoped that by stimulating U.S. export activity the DISC would lessen significant
balance of payments and balance of trade problems. 13 Despite some revision by
the Congress in 1975 and 1976,14 the DISC's focus and purpose have remained
essentially unchanged.
A DISC is a domestic corporation which meets certain minimal structural
requirements 5 and limits itself almost exclusively to export activity. ' 6 If a DISC
derives at least 95 percent of its income from export activity, and if 95 percent of
9. Following the enactment of the DISC in January of 1972, many countries complained that the
tax incentive violated U.S. obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
See infra notes 50 & 51 and accompanying text. The DISC became a major irritant in U.S. trade
relations, and in the words of Rep. Dan Rostenkowski served as "a stumbling block preventing
discussions of important trade matters in sessions of the GATT Council." 98 CONG. REC. H 6580-81
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).
10. Wagner, DISC Provides Tax Benefits for U.S. Exports, in U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INT'L




14. The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 denied DISC benefits to profits arising from products in short
domestic supply and from exports of natural resources. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 made DISC
benefits limited to income attributable to export gross receipts in excess of 67 percent of average gross
receipts in a four year base period. DISC's with adjusted taxable income of $100,000 or less are
exempt from this rule. Also, DISC benefits on the sale of military goods were limited to one-half the
amount otherwise allowed. The other substantive change was that the period of recapture of the
deferred tax was lengthened to twice the number of years of the DISC's existence, up to a maximum
of ten years. OPERATION AND EFFECT, supra note 8, at 5-6.
15. To qualify for DISC status, a DISC must be incorporated under the laws of any State or the
District of Columbia, have only one class of stock, have a $2,500 paid-in capital value, maintain its
own bank account and accounting records, and file an election to be treated as a DISC with the IRS.
Wagner, supra note 10, at 109.
16. Id.
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its adjusted basis assets at the close of the tax year are export related, 7 the
corporation may defer taxes on 42.5 percent of its export income indefinitely. '8 A
DISC need not have either employees or real operations as long as the 95 percent
export assets/receipts requirement is met. 19
The sale of export property 0 between the DISC and its parent may be priced
according to the most beneficial of three formulas for the DISC,"1 granting
corporate managers great latitude in the construction of export sales strategy. 22
Moreover, DISC income is taxed only when export income is distributed to
shareholders or a DISC is terminated. 23 Combined with the rather relaxed re-
quirements for establishment of the DISC, 24 the tax deferral and export property
sale provisions of the program make exporting through a DISC very attractive.
2. The Economic Benefits of the DISC.
To the individual exporter, the DISC offers great economic benefits .2 6 Statistics
published by the Treasury Department for DISC year 1981 show that 71.1 percent
of total U.S. exports of manufactured goods were accomplished through the
DISC,2 7 and that the DISC incentive was directly responsible for between seven
to 11 billion dollars of export activity. 28 As of February 1983, some 17,163 DISC
17. To be eligible for the tax deduction, receipts must be derived from the sale or lease for use
outside the U.S. of export goods, or from the furnishing of services related or subsidiary to the sale or
lease of export property. Dividends on stock of a related foreign export corporation and interest on
obligations which are qualified export assets are also considered qualified. Under the law, commis-
sion receipts are also included. DISC Substitute Detailed in Administration Draft Proposals, TAX
NOTES, June 18, 1983, at 240 [hereinafter cited as DISC Substitute].
18. If a DISC is not owned by a corporation, however, taxes on 50 percent of its income may be
deferred. Wagner, supra note 10, at 109.
19. DISC Substitute, supra note 17, at 240; see also I.R.C. § 992 (1971).
20. Export property is generally defined as goods that are manufactured, produced, grown, or
extracted in the United States solely for export. Exports that are directly subsidized by the U.S.
government or exports that are intended for later use in the United States do not qualify as export
property. DISC Substitute, supra note 17, at 240; see also I.R.C. § 993 (1971).
21. OPERATION AND ErwEcr, supra note 8, at 4.
22. By allowing corporate tax planners to manipulate intercompany pricing policies, a high degree
of flexibility is achieved in the manufacturer-DISC relationship. This flexibility allows corporate
planners to consider marketing strategies with the understanding that their tax burden will always be
minimal-essentially doing away with the taxation variable in the investment and marketing
equation.
23. DISC Substitute, supra note 17, at 240; see also I.R.C. § 992 (1971).
24. See I.R.C. §§ 992-997 (1971).
25. In testimony before a House subcommittee, one businessman stated:
The experience of my own company ... shows the benefits a DISC can produce. When we
first established a DISC our exports were only 36 percent of our total sales. Today, exports
constitute over 70 percent of our total sales. Our domestic sales have grown only 26 percent in
this period while our export sales have grown 424 percent. Thus the value of export tax
incentives]
Hearings, Tax Incentives, supra note 6, at 71 (testimony of Frank A. March, National Ocean
Industries Association).
26. OPERATION AND Ev'Ecr, supra note 8, at 8.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 13.
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corporations had been registered with the Internal Revenue Service. 2 9 Moreover,
the fierce resistence by the business lobby to the proposed elimination of the
DISC by the Carter Administration is further evidence that the program has
worked to the benefit of the export production community. 3 0
There is, however, strong disagreement among experts over the macro-eco-
nomic effects of the DISC program. The debate focuses on the usefulness of tax
code manipulation as a means of channeling investment capital into particular
sectors of the economy. Consequently, in order to evaluate the potential of the
FSC, it is necessary to review the economic lessons of the DISC program.
Assessing the long term effects of the DISC is empirically problematic. 31 For
example, in the years of the DISC's existence, the U.S. share of free world
exports of manufactures has actually declined. 32 Indeed, the program has been
criticised because the anticipated dividends of the DISC have not proven to be as
great as expected. 
33
First, it has been argued that the basic macro-economic effect of the DISC is a
long-run reduction in U.S. economic well-being. 34 According to critics, as the
amount and value of U.S. manufactured goods sent overseas rises, use of a DISC
reduces the price of American goods to foreign consumers, leading other coun-
tries to respond in turn by exporting more to the United States. 35 As the cost of
goods produced by a foreign manufacturer must fall to meet the price of a DISC-
subsidized good, while the cost of a good made in the U.S. for domestic con-
sumption without the benefit of a tax incentive would not change, the level of
29. In testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee, one executive asserted:
Foreign sales and foreign market development cannot be a faucet that we turn on and off
.... [R]ecurrent attack on the DISC ... is a severe deterrent to the business man in my part
of the country, and the country at large.
It is our firm belief that such actions [i.e., repeal of the DISC] will drive many U.S.-based
companies out of a number of foreign markets in which they are active today and further
encourage major foreign penetration into weakened U.S. markets.
The President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals: Hearings before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3634-35 (1978) (testimony of William Bricen Miller, Mid-
America Council for International Economic Policy).
30. It is impossible to estimate how much export business would have been done without the DISC
because the analysis requires a subjective evaluation of the export decision-making process of large
numbers of business executives. The only objective evidence lies in their own comments on the
subject, and these comments emphasize the indispensible nature of the DISC incentive. Hearings,
Tax Incentives, supra note 6, at 17-63 (letters concerning the proposed repeal of the DISC).
31. Between 1970 and 1981 while the volume of U.S. exports increased substantially, the U.S.
share of free world exports of manufactures declined from 21.1 percent to 20.7 percent. STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 1, at 780.
32. Despite outstanding performance from the export sector of the economy, the U.S. balance of
trade showed a $31,677.3 million deficit in 1982. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 63 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 16-17 (Nov. 1983). Further, the U.S. balance of
payments for 1983 showed a deficit of fully $63,521 million. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
1984, at 49 (1984).
33. See J. Mutti & H. Grubert, DISC and Its Effects (December 3-4, 1983) (paper presented
before the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on the Structure and Evolution of
Recent U.S. Trade Policy).
34. Id. at 21-22.
35. Id. at 19-20.
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U.S. imports would necessarily rise.3 6 Consequently, as a result of the DISC,
output of goods by American producers for the domestic markets would actually
decline.37 Thus, in the long run, U.S. balance of trade 38 and balance of pay-
ments3 9 levels are eroded.
Second, it is claimed that the DISC has a detrimental effect on the net welfare
of the domestic and international economy. According to this argument, insofar
as the DISC incentive draws capital into the export sector of the economy and
away from other sectors it causes inefficiencies 4 as well as resulting in lost tax
revenues. 41 For the DISC to improve welfare effects it would be necessary for the
program to produce enough taxable income to offset the revenue lost by the
treasury as a result of the incentive. 42 In sum, the long-term effect of the govern-
ment's manipulation of the tax code to improve export performance is actually
deterioration of the health of the entire U.S. economy.
The attacks against the DISC, usually based on claims that it causes inefficien-
cies, harms balance of trade and balance of payments levels, and causes negative
welfare effects, are indeed serious. Yet, in light of a study by Price-Water-
house, 43 these arguments seem unfounded. The Price-Waterhouse study demon-
strates the positive influence of the DISC incentive on domestic economic
efficiency, U.S. balance of payments and balance of trade levels, and on the long-
term welfare of the American economy. 4
36. The outcome from Mutti and Grubert's model, which assumes production of all goods requires
three factors of production (unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital), and each nation produces three
goods (a net export good, a net import good, and a non-traded good) with homogeneous capital,
shows that as output of net export good rises, output of net non-traded, or domestic goods declines.
Id. at 19.
37. The "balance of trade" is simply the difference between the dollar value of exports and
imports in a given year. It is important to understand that the balance of trade refers only to the
difference between exports and imports, and not the volume of trade. R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER,
ECONOMICS 774 (6th ed. 1981)
38. The "balance of payments" represents the measure of the transactions going on between
countries. Any transaction that is expected to lead to a payment to other nations represents a debit,
because it subtracts from foreign exchange reserves. Similarly, any transaction that is expected to lead
to a payment by foreigners to the U.S. is classified as a credit. Id. at 772.
39. Because the DISC is an artificial incentive, it draws capital away from the sectors of the
economy in which, all else being equal, business would tend to invest. By distorting the market, the
incentive creates inefficient allocations of capital.
40. The estimated revenue cost of the DISC in DISC year 1981 was $1,650 million. OPERATION
AND EFFECT, supra note 8, at 1.
41. It is argued that to the extent that the DISC draws capital away from foreign markets, the capital
will come on the average from countries in which the corporate tax rate is at least as high as the rate in
the United States. J. Mutti & H. Grubert, supia note 33, at 24. Moreover, whatever positive effect the
DISC might produce, the income distributional shifts and the output adjustments caused by the tax
incentive are far too harmful to be justified by the benefits of the incentive. Mutti and Grubert assert
that in the final analysis, "A basic condition for DISC to improve ... welfare is [that] DISC must
result in the reallocation of capital away from low tax uses toward high tax uses." Id. at 23-24.
42. See Hearings, Tax Incentives, supra note 6, at 80-155 (A Study on the Economic Impacts of
the Domestic International Sales Corporation Tax Provisions, prepared by Price-Waterhouse (1982)).
43. See supra note 1.
44. It must be remembered that the DISC is designed to reduce the cost of capital employed in
export activities, thus making investment projects, insofar as they are evaluated in terms of the cost of
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The pernicious effects of the DISC incentive on capital investment cited by the
DISC's opponents are overstated. In an economy operating at full capacity, the
DISC tax incentive would draw capital out of other productive enterprises. Yet,
the economy of the U.S. is operating far from capacity4 5 and it may be assumed
that DISC is bringing into production resources that otherwise could well have
stood idle. 46
The argument that DISC reduces economic efficiency is also unfounded.
While it is true that DISC-type incentives will cause market distortions that create
inefficiency, the U.S. economy is already full of market distortions which skew
the benefits of investment to particular sectors of the economy. 4 DISC actually
facilitates domestic economic efficiency by changing the law to give tax adjust-
ments on the profits from private export activity, in much the same way that tax
advantages are given to other private producers or governmental units. 48
Insofar as the DISC incentive promotes a net increase in export revenue, 49 it
will improve the balance of payments situation. Some argue that the effects on
foreign production of goods for the U.S. market triggered by the DISC incentive
would offset any benefit for domestic export production firms that the program
might produce. Yet, as the Price-Waterhouse study points out, the initial effects
of the DISC on the balance of payments are positive.50 While there is an initial
deterioration in the U.S. terms of trade, 5 over the long term the increase in the
capital, more attractive. The testimony of business decision-makers cited earlier, Hearings, Tax
Incentives, supra note 6, at 146 (Price-Waterhouse study), tends to validate the underlying proposi-
tion. In an economy with so much excess capacity, it is clear that the "allocation of capital is not a
zero-sum game in which increased capital formation in one sector requires decreased capital forma-
tion in another sector." Id.
45. The Price-Waterhouse study points out that the complicated system of tax credits and exemp-
tions written into the tax code serve to equalize after-tax rates of return from different sectors of the
economy. Thus, the optimal distribution of productive imputs is subverted to the extent that the tax
code actually serves to redistribute returns on investment. Consequently, it is extremely difficult to
determine the efficiency effects of any specific tax incentive because of the distortions inherent in the
system. Id. at 147.
46. The tax code is biased against private capital in favor of public capital to the extent that
schools, hospitals and roads are exempt from taxes, while private concerns are not. Therefore, any
proposal which reduces the marginal rate of taxation on any portion of private capital investments
would promote a more efficient allocation of capital in the U.S. by compensating for that bias. T.
Horst, An Economic Analysis of the Foreign International Sales Corporation Proposal (Sept. 1981)
(unpublished paper), cited in Hearings, Tax Incentives, supra note 6, at 149.
47. The Treasury Department estimates that repeal of the DISC would result in a loss of between
$7 and $11 billion of export revenue. OPERATION AND EFFECr, supra note 8, at 12.
48. Hearings, Tax Incentives, supra note 6, at 146-47 (Price-Waterhouse study).
49. The distribution of the gain as a result of trade between two nations is determined by the
"terms of trade," that is, the quantity of domestic goods that must be exported to get a unit of
imported good. R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra note 37, at 738.
50. The deterioration in the terms of trade of the U.S. is produced by a reduction in the price of
U.S. export goods, while the price of import goods remains constant. Eventually, however, the
reduction in the price of each American export good will be offset by increased foreign demand for
those goods, and U.S. terms of trade will improve. Hearings, Tax Incentives, supra note 6, at 140
(Price-Waterhouse study).
51. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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quantity of U.S. exports as a result of the DISC will improve the terms of trade as
well. 52
Finally, it is difficult to argue that a program damages the economy's health
when, in fact, the incentive returns to the domestic economy seven to 11 dollars
for each tax dollar invested. 53 The DISC would therefore seem to produce, as
Price-Waterhouse argues, significant economic benefits.5 4 In light of the DISC's
effects on capital flow and economic efficiency, U.S. balance of payments and
balance of trade, and U.S. economic health, it must be concluded that the DISC,
or a DISC-style incentive, is a valuable catalyst to the U.S. economy.
The DISC is consequently an example of the potential benefits of using the tax
code to stimulate investment and production. It demonstrates that generous tax
incentives will encourage investment, benefit the business community, and con-
tribute to the health of the U.S. economy. The DISC program should therefore
provide the standards against which the efficacy of the proposed Foreign Sales
Corporation should be judged.
B. The Structure and Benefits of the FSC
The essential structural differences of the proposed FSC from the DISC are
reflected in the foreign presence requirements, structural requirements, transfer
pricing rules, and most significantly, in the provisions governing the distribution
of dividends. The FSC must meet each of three foreign presence requirements55
in order to ensure that its tax exempt income arises from foreign economic
processes. 5 6 These requirements are designed to meet the terms of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) "Understanding"" 7 regarding the taxa-
tion of extra-territorial income. By forcing the FSC to be technically a foreign
52. As the cost to the Treasury of the DISC program is about $11 billion a year, and it produces
between seven and $11 billion in additional export revenue, each DISC dollar has a multiplier effect of
between seven and 11. Many studies of the American economy have been made that suggest the
ordinary Gross National Product multiplier is between 1.5 and 2. See R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER, supra
note 37, at 531.
53. When surveyed as to the appropriate role of the government in stimulating exports by small
businesses, the business community rated tax incentives as the single most appropriate and effective
policy option available. See Hearings, Tax Incentives, supra note 6, at 70 (testimony of Frank A.
March, National Ocean Industries Association).
54. Treasury Department statistics show that 43.6 percent of all DISC returns showed a net income
of less than $100,000, proving the small exporter has effective access to the incentive. See
OPERATION AND EFFEcr, supra note 8, at 23.
55. The FSC must be managed outside the United States. The three tests for this foreign presence
requirement are that all meetings of the board of directors of the corporation and shareholders be held
outside the U.S.; that the principal bank account of the FSC be maintained outside the U.S.; and that
all dividends, legal and accounting fees, and salaries be disbursed from a bank account outside the
U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation Act of 1983, supra note 4, at § 924(c)(l)-(3).
56. The FSC must also meet a foreign economic processes test, which under § 924(d) demands
that the corporation participate outside the U.S. in the solicitation, negotiation, or the making of the
contract relating to an export transaction; and that the foreign direct costs incurred by the FSC
attributable to the transaction equal or exceed 50 percent of the total direct costs incurred by the FSC
attributable to the export transaction. Id. at § 924(d)(I)-(2).
57. On January 1, 1972, the DISC became law, and by February 4, the European Economic
Community had turned to the General Agreement on Tariffs and RTade (GATT) adjudicatory mecha-
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operation, GATT objections to the deferral of taxation on domestic income
earned through export activity are effectively defused."
A FSC must also meet four structural requirements under the proposed rules.
In order to qualify for the tax advantage, the FSC must maintain an office outside
of U.S. territory;59 have the foreign office maintain a summary of its permanent
books of account; 60 have at least one director who resides outside U.S. territory;
61
and maintain an office within the U.S. where the corporation's records are
available for inspection. 62 The drafters of the FSC have tried to accommodate
small businesses through the inclusion of provisions for a "small FSC ' ' 63 and by
exempting from the new rules established DISC's with under ten million dollars
in qualified export receipts.64
The importance of the transfer pricing rules, which govern the sale of export
property to a FSC by a corporate parent or other I.R.C. § 482 "person", 65 lies in
the fact that these rules determine the size of the foreign gross trading receipts
earned by the FSC. It is this income, earned from transactions between the parent
and the FSC, that is subject to federal taxation. 66 Under the FSC transfer pricing
system, the taxable income of the FSC and its parent is based on a transfer price
that allows the FSC income no greater than either 1.83 percent of foreign trading
nisms to force the U.S. to end the DISC program. The U.S. countered by charging that the tax
policies of France, Belgium and the Netherlands were in violation of the GAIT rules.
In four reports issued on November 2, 1976, the GATT Panel found that all the tax practices
brought to its attention were violations of GATT Article XVI:4-the prohibition on export subsidies.
In 1981 the U.S., subject to an "Understanding," agreed to the adoption of the 1976 report. The
"Understanding" stated that GATT signatories were not required to tax export income attributable to
economic processes located outside their territorial limits; that the "arm's-length" pricing principle
should be observed in transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under common
control; and that the GATT would not prohibit the adoption of methods to avoid the double taxation of
foreign source income. DISC Substitute, supra note 17, at 241.
58. Under the GATT "Understanding", a country does not have to tax income earned outside its
borders. It is to take advantage of this provision that the Reagan Administration proposal requires the
FSC to be managed outside the United States. Id. at 242.
Consequently, by requiring that the Foreign Sales Corporation operate outside U.S. territory and
that the tax-exempt income be attributable to "foreign economic processes", see supra note 56, the
attacks by the EEC on U.S. export policy are rendered ineffective. DISC Substitute, supra note 17, at
241.
59. Foreign Sales Corporation Act of 1983, supra note 4, at § 922(a)(1)(D)(i).
60. Id. at § 922(a)(l)(D)(ii).
61. Id. at § 922(a)(l)(E).
62. Id. at § 922(a)(l)(D)(iii).
63. A "small FSC" is one which is not a member, at any time during the taxable year, of a
controlled group of corporations which includes another FSC, unless the other FSC has also made a
small FSC election which is in effect for the tax year. Id. at § 922(b)(2). If its foreign trade gross
receipts do not exceed $2,500,000 a taxable year, then the FSC may use the administrative pricing
rules without regard for the foreign presence requirements. Id. at § 924(b)(2)(B)(i).
64. See generally id. at § 927 section 2. By allowing this exemption from the foreign presence
requirements for the small exporter, the very significant problems that such requirements would pose
for the small business are solved.
65. Section 482 of the I.R.C., the "Allocation of Income and Deductions among Taxpayers"
provision, covers all "organizations, trades or businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or
not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated)" that are "owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests."
66. Foreign Sales Corporation Act of 1983, supra note 4, at § 921(d).
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gross receipts derived from the sale of export property, 23 percent of the com-
bined taxable income of the FSC and its parent which is derived from the sale of
export property or taxable income based upon the sale price actually charged the
parent. 
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The DISC data indicates that reductions in the cost of capital to the exporter
through enhancement of profit levels are essential to the success of any policy
designed to promote private sector export production. The effectiveness of the
FSC incentive therefore must be judged by its effect on the difference or
"wedge" between pre-tax and after-tax return on export production profits. The
FSC will promote export production only to the extent that it reduces the size of
the tax wedge.
The most crucial provision of the FSC, in terms of the reduction of the tax
wedge, is the rule governing the distribution of dividends from export earnings.
Corporate shareholders of a FSC are allowed to take the dividends distributed by
the FSC free from federal tax liability. 61 Since the federal tax wedge between pre-
tax and after-tax earnings is removed, companies could conceivably earn higher
profits from export activity than from foreign investment despite the fact that the
pre-tax rate of return on the latter may be greater. Since business investment
decisions are made based upon the after-tax return of possible investment oppor-
tunities, 69 the use of a FSC incentive can thus encourage export production.
While the FSC does promise U.S. exporters great benefits, the bill contains a
major flaw. As the "export property" requirements are stated in the Administra-
tion's proposal, fully "50 percent of the fair market value [of the products
brokered by a FSC] may be attributable to articles imported into the United
States".7° Thus, a large, vertically integrated multi-national corporation could
use cheaper foreign labor and materials to complete the major manufacturing
processes, and then use American labor in the finishing process to meet the 50
percent domestic value requirement. In the steel industry, for example, a multina-
tional could use Korean mills and labor for the initial production, and only then
67. id. at § 925(a)(I)-(3).
68. Foreign Sales Corporation Act § 927(c) states: "[T]here shall be allowed as a deduction an
amount equal to 100 percent of any dividend received by such corporation from another corporation
which is distributed out of earning and profits attributable to foreign trade income .... The deduc-
tion allowable under the preceding sentence with respect to any dividend shall be in lieu of any (other)
deduction." Id. at § 927(c).
Aside from the costs imposed by the foreign presence requirements, the wedge between pre-tax
and after-tax return is completely removed by the FSC dividend provisions. The dividends of a FSC
corporation are effectively tax-free, thus increasing the profit on each dollar invested in export
production by the percentage of the profit that ordinarily would have been taken in taxes. Because
profits are higher, the opportunity costs of committing capital to export production are significantly
reduced.
69. See supra note 3.
70. The FSC legislation defines "export property" to include property manufactured, grown, or
extracted in the U.S. by a person other than [the FSC which is] held primarily for sale, lease, or rental
in the ordinary course of business by or to a FSC, for direct use, consumption, or disposition outside
the U.S. Id. at § 927(a)(I)(A)(B). Labeling a product which is 50 percent foreign substance or
construction to be "manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted in the U.S." is indeed an interest-
ing bit of legislative drafting.
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use American workers to carry out some minor finishing tasks. As the difference
in wages earned by a Korean factory worker and a member of the United Steel
Workers is significant, 7 the massive tax benefits of the FSC would induce the
corporation to go no further than the 50 percent domestic value requirement.
It is crucial to the long-run success of U.S. export policy that tax incentives be
allowed only for the export of goods and services in which the vast majority of
the value is derived from the efforts of American workers. Without this require-
ment, the U.S. taxpayer could end up subsidizing foreign manufacturing opera-
tions rather than export production activities of American business and labor. The
problem with the proposed FSC domestic content requirements can be easily
solved by requiring all export property used by a FSC to be substantially of
American manufacture and assembly. Such a requirement would promote domes-
tic industry while working little hardship on the corporate community.
Notwithstanding the export property composition issue, the FSC can be a
valuable asset for the U.S. exporter. Although the stiff foreign presence require-
ments and greater complexity of the FSC make the structural costs of the program
greater than the costs of the DISC,72 the tax-free dividend is sufficient to effec-
tively enhance the profitability of export production.73 Further, insofar as the FSC
meets GATT objections to current U.S. export policy,74 it can contribute not only
to domestic prosperity, but to improved trade relations as well. The FSC should
therefore make a productive addition to U.S. export policy.
II. THE STATE UNITARY TAXATION OF FOREIGN-SOURCE INCOME
In order for the new export policy to be effective, it is necessary to provide a
disincentive to direct foreign investment by large U.S.-based corporations in
addition to the FSC export incentive. The DISC experience has proven that an
export tax incentive alone will not have a major impact on the U.S. balance of
payments and balance of trade,75 or even on the U.S. share of the world market. 
7 6
Only insofar as the tax system can equalize the after-tax return between direct
foreign investment and domestic investment for export can the goals of the DISC
71. According to figures supplied by the American Institute of Iron and Steel, the per hour cost of
an American worker in terms of wages and benefits is $21.68. Republic of Korea (South Korea), a
major exporter of steel to the U.S., pays its workers far less. Estimates of the pay scales of Korean
steelworkers have ranged down as far as $2.80 per hour.
72. The foreign presence requirement of the FSC increases structural costs far beyond those
produced by the relatively simply requirements of the DISC. See supra note 56.
73. Currently, the pre-tax return on foreign investment is, for a number of reasons, higher in many
instances than the return on investment in domestic production for export. See infra note 108. By
changing the rate at which foreign-source profits and domestic export productions are taxed, the FSC
can make the actual net return on export production greater than the net return on foreign investment.
Thus, the fact that foreign investment brings higher pre-tax return becomes irrelevant to the rational
profit-maximizing business.
74. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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program be achieved. 7 The FSC represents the incentive element in a tax policy
aimed at increasing export activity; the disincentive element should be state
unitary taxation of corporate foreign-source income.
A. The Unitary Tax as a Disincentive to Direct Foreign Investment.
A number of states7" have found the unitary system an effective way to enhance
tax revenue at the expense of multi-jurisdictional corporations. 79 Under the tradi-
tional "arm's-length" system of taxation, a business is taxed based upon its
dealings within the legal borders of the taxing jurisdiction. 8 0 When applied to
vertically integrated multi-jurisdictional corporations, however, the "arm's-
length" system has proven to be ineffective for bringing in tax revenue in propor-
tion to corporate earnings. 8 The unitary system, by contrast, operates on the
77. In essence, only if the after-tax return on domestic investment, Rd, plus the FSC tax incentive,
F, is greater than the return on foreign investment, Rf will the rational profit-maximizing busi-
nessman invest in the United States and export rather than invest directly in a foreign nation.
78. Currently, 12 states have implemented world-wide unitary taxation: Alaska, California, Colo-
rado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusette, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah. Illinois,
Minnesota and New York are among a group of states that uses a modified form of the unitary system,
limiting the system's application to U.S. operations only. See New Tax in 12 States Angers Big
Business, Ann Arbor News, Jan. 29, 1984, at E9 [hereinafter cited as New Taxes].
79. For the purposes of this section, "multi-jurisdictional corporation" should be understood to
mean any corporation that has business operations in more than one State. This definition also
encompasses the traditional multi-national corporation.
80. State Taxation of Foreign Source Income: Hearing before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1980) (prepared statement of Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.,
Maryland) [hereinafter cited as Hearing, State Taxation].
81. According to James B. Zagel, Director of the Illinois Department of Revenue, the "arm's-
length" method of taxation leads to the following:
Exxon, I believe-and I think these are the facts-did somewhere between $14 and $16
million a year of sales in the State of Wisconsin. They had something like ten to $12 million
worth of property, and their initial tax return showed they owed no taxes to the State of
Wisconsin....
Now the fact of the matter is, that this is the kind of phenomenon that occurs with unitary
businesses.
Id. at 126.
The "arm's-length" method is highly vulnerable to abuse because of its reliance on essentially
artificial and formalistic distinctions within vertically integrated corporations. As one Teasury De-
partment report put it: "[V]ery substantial tax benefits turn upon an artificial factor: whether a foreign
corporate charter has been interposed between foreign income and the U.S. taxpayer." Id. at 100.
Consequently, the "arm's-length" system actually promotes a corporate shell game, in which profits
are hidden behind various corporate charters.
In testimon , before the House Ways and Means Committee, William D. Dexter, the General
Counsel of the Multistate Tax Commission, described the "shell game" in action:
[A] major domestic oil corporation ... translated internal domestic sales into sales of its
foreign affiliated corporations by transferring crude oil produced in the United States and
refined and marketed in the United States to sales of crude oil from its foreign subsidiaries. It
accomplished this result by a paper transfer of the crude oil to foreign subsidiaries in the
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principle that a corporation that is unified in a business sense should be treated as
a single entity for tax purposes.82 Tax responsibilities are calculated not with
reference to political boundaries, but rather by a formula that looks to local
percentages of total corporate payroll, sales, and property holdings.83 Unitary
taxation has been called the "wave of the future" because it is the most effective
system for collecting proper amounts of tax revenue from multi-jurisdictional
enterprises. 14
Large corporations, especially the multinationals, strongly attack the use of the
unitary system because it raises their aggregate tax responsibility and "compli-
cates decisions on matters such as future plant locations". 8 It is precisely be-
cause the unitary system will raise corporate taxes and, at the same time,
eliminate the tax differences between legal jurisdictions that it can operate as a
disincentive for direct foreign investment.
To illustrate the effects of the unitary system, assume that without unitary
taxation, a corporation can realize ten million dollars more of after-tax return on a
particular foreign investment than on a comparable domestic investment. If the
corporation is then taxed under the unitary system by all the states in which it
does business and if federal taxes are held constant, much of the extra earnings
from foreign operations will have to be used to satisfy that corporation's increased
state tax responsibility.
If at the same time a sufficently large FSC-type incentive is offered for export
activity, so large that the reductions in federal taxes would offset the increased
state tax liability, domestic investment in export production would become more
profitable, after taxes, than direct foreign investment. The combination of the
FSC and the unitary tax would make the after-tax return on export production
greater than the return on direct foreign investment. Consequently, the rational
profit-maximizing corporation will invest within the United States. 
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course of the movement of the crude oil in its tankers on the high seas as the crude oil moved
from its domestic production fields to its domestic refineries in the United States.
Id. at 25. By placing the oil under the "control" of the foreign subsidiary, it became immune from
U.S. taxation.
82. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 51 U.S.L.W. 4987, 4988-989 (U.S. June
28, 1983).
83. See Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multijurisdictional Corporations: Reflections on
Mobil, Exxon, and H.R. 5076, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 113, 117-18 (1980).
84. Hearing, State Taxation, supra note 80, at 57 (California State Franchise Tax Board Position
Paper). Indeed, California, which has had some 30 years experience with the unitary tax, estimates
that the use of the unitary system, in 1977, produced almost $500 million in additional tax revenue
each year, with most of the revenue coming from multi-jurisdictional enterprises. Id. at 67-68
(Report on "Revenue Impact of Section 2173," submitted by the State of California Franchise Tax
Board).
85. New Tax, supra note 78, at E9.
86. The unitary system treats domestic earnings and foreign source earnings equally. Conse-
quently, the difference between the after-tax return on a foreign invested dollar and a domestic dollar
is significantly reduced and the effect of the FSC incentive is magnified. Thus, return on domestic
investment, Rd, plus the FSC, F, will often be greater than the return on foreign investment, Rf
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B. Implementation of the Unitary System: the Necessity for State
Action.
The unitary system of taxation of foreign-source income by state governments
has proven to be constitutional,87 effective,8 8 and quite fair. 89 Indeed, the sim-
plicity of the system has led to suggestions that the federal government adopt the
unitary method in order to end the reliance by the courts on the "ad hoc ...
approaches" necessary for adjudicating tax disputes under the "arm's length"
system. 9 Federal government implementation of the unitary system, however,
would require a suspension of political reality. Current treaty obligations would
make such a policy at best problematic, and at worst lead to serious international
trade disruptions. 91 Moreover, Congressmen would be subject to an enormous
amount of political pressure from the corporate community to block the institu-
tion of the unitary tax. The fate of the Carter Administration's proposal to end the
foreign tax credit is evidence of the effectiveness of the corporate lobby.92
87. California's system of unitary taxation, based on a three factor formula that assesses taxes on
the local percentage of total payroll, sales, and property, was upheld against constitutional challenge
in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 51 U.S.L.W. 4987 (U.S. June 28, 1983). In
Container Corp., the unitary system was challenged as causing unfair double taxation of corporate
income and as violating the Commerce Clause and Foreign Commerce Clause.
In its decision, the Supreme Court asserted that while the possibility of double-taxation was real, it
was necessary to take into account the context in which the taxation took place, and the reasonable
alternatives available to the state. Because "[allocating] among various taxing jurisdictions bears
some resemblance ... to slicing a shadow," the Court found no reason to force California to cease
using the unitary system.
Moreover, the California system met the Commerce Clause test of Exxon Corp. v. Department of
Revenue of Wisconsin, 447 U.S. 207,219-20 (1980), and the Foreign Commerce Clause test of Japan
Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445-46 (1979). The Court therefore gave a final
stamp of constitutionality to the use of the unitary system by the states to tax U.S. multijurisdictional
corporations. See also Hellerstein, supra note 83.
88. The effectiveness of the unitary system may be gauged by the estimates that the states that use
the unitary system produce regarding the extra revenue obtained as a result of unitary taxation, see
supra note 84, and by the fierce opposition of the corporate community to the expansion of that
system. See New Tax, supra note 78, at E9.
89. As one state tax commissioner stated, "The [unitary system] is not perfect. It simply is the best
yet discovered for dealing with the unitary business." Hearing, State Taxation. supra note 80, at 21
(statement of Byron Dorgan, Past Chairman, Multistate Tax Commission, also Tax Commissioner,
State of North Dakota).
90. Note, Multinational Corporations and Income Allocation Under Section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1202, 1238 (1976).
91. A common thread in the testimony of representatives of multinational business before the
House Ways and Means Committee was that "progress has been made in securing a degree of
international consensus that tax jurisdiction is exercised only where there is actual physical pres-
ence." Indeed, institution of the unitary system could lead to wide-scale retaliation by other nations.
Consequently, the multijurisdictional corporate community vigorously opposes use of the unitary tax
in order to save the government of the United States from diplomatic embarrassment. Hearing, State
Taxation, supra note 80, at 179 (statement of Charles S. Levy, Vice-President, Emergency Committee
for American Tlade).
Indeed, the use of the unitary tax by the states has already caused some international difficulty.
Twelve countries have filed complaints with the U.S. government about the unitary system, and two
of the 12 have halted renegotiations of tax treatises. New Tax, supra note 78, at E9.
92. The Carter Administration proposed the elimination of the foreign tax credit, asserting that
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The states, however, are uniquely situated to implement the unitary system of
taxation. There is a pressing need to raise revenues to fund state services, 93 and
the multi-jurisdictional corporations have recently become more attractive to state
legislators as potential sources of tax monies. 94 Moreover, because local voters
see little personal repercussions from additional taxes on "outside" corporations,
and since strictly local businesses would support measures that reduced their tax
burden, 95 the political benefits a state legislator gains from taxing a "foreign"
corporation could well outweigh the arguments of a multi-jurisdictional corpora-
tion's lobbyist. 96 Finally, the states are free from the restraints of international
treaties and obligations which constrain Federal treatment of foreign source
income.
Several major objections can be raised to the use by the states of the unitary tax
system as a tool of U.S. export policy. First, in order to assure the scheme's
success, there must be almost absolute uniformity of use. Absent uniformity,
corporations could simply locate in a non-unitary state, and effectively negate the
possibility that state taxation would equalize the after-tax return on domestic and
foreign investment.
The evidence indicates, however, that uniformity is an achievable goal. Cur-
rently, twelve states have implemented a worldwide unitary system, 97 and nine-
teen states are members of the Multistate Tax Commission, an organization
dedicated to the promotion of the unitary system. 9 These states have enacted a
uniform body of law, known as the "Three Factor Formula", to govern tax
collection. 99 Thus, an aggressive lobbying campaign in favor of the unitary
system could achieve the necessary results.
The unitary system has also been subject to attack on the grounds of its
perceived unfairness to multinational business. It is argued that the unitary tax is
termination would preclude tax benefits from turning on the choice of corporate structure, end the tax
incentive to invest overseas, simplify the tax rules, aid equity and competition, and increase U.S. tax
revenue. Hearing, State Taxation, supra note 80, at 99-103. Indeed, the evidence indicates that the
effects of termination would be precisely those predicted by the Treasury Department. Nonetheless,
the Carter proposal was rejected by Congress.
93. New Tax, supra note 78, at E9.
94. In the wake of the "New Federalism," state governments are in need of revenue. Property,
personal, and sales taxes will not produce the amounts of money necessary to deal with decaying
infrastructure and to provide state welfare services. Over the past 20 years personal taxes have
increased from 7 percent of state revenue to 13 percent. Corporate taxes, on the other hand, have only
risen from 4 percent of state revenue to only 5 percent. Thus, the only untapped source of tax revenue
is the multi-jurisdictional corporation. Id.
95. Id.
96. Rarely will a multi-jurisdictional corporation be able to carry enough weight within a particular
state to be able to counter the political appeal of increasing corporate taxes in order to maintain state
services and keep personal taxes low. Conversely, the multi-jurisdictional corporation is most power-
ful in the national legislature (i.e., the Congress) because the corporation is geared to operations at a
national (or supra-national) level. By attacking through the state legislatures, wholly in-state business
and other organizations may be able to concentrate more resources to the fight than a corporation with
a center of gravity designed for cross-jurisdiction operations. Thus, a state legislator could well find
that the most powerful interests are those based within his state, and respond accordingly.
97. New Tax, supra note 78, at E9.
98. Hearing, State Taxation, supra note 80, at 18, 20 (statement of Byron L. Dorgan).
99. Id. at 18.
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unfair because corporations that are similarly situated with regard to the local
taxing authority are treated differently as a result of the performance of an extra-
territorial subsidiary. 100 Fairness, it is argued, demands that a corporation be
taxed solely on the performance of its local facilities. '0'
It is true that taxation of world-wide income could well produce different tax
responsibilities for corporations similarly situated in a particular domestic juris-
diction. 02 It is not true, however, that this is unfair. In terms of the corporate
balance sheet, geography is irrelevant. Consequently, there is no logical reason to
prevent a state taxing authority from treating multinational corporate operations
within its jurisdiction as elements of an integrated whole. 1
03
Corporations also claim that the unitary tax is unfair because the calculation of
foreign-source income is distorted by the higher wage rates and property values
in the U.S. 104 and by the necessity for high rates of return on investment in
unstable foreign markets. 105 The unitary system, by ignoring those factors, pro-
duces artificially inflated tax responsibilities. 106 The distortions caused by U.S.
wage rates and property values, however, are not distortions at all but merely
represent the cost of using American workers or factories to produce goods. 1
07
Further, by insisting that the tax system recognize the necessity of high rates of
return on foreign investment, the corporate community is asking the domestic tax
payer to subsidize the movement of investment capital into risky ventures over-
seas when that capital could have been invested in the U.S. Fairness demands the
use of the unitary tax to reach corporate foreign-source income.
100. Id. at 155 (statement of Ernest S. Christian, Jr., Counsel, Committee on State Taxation of the
Council of State Chambers of Commerce).
101. Id. at 154-55.
102. Id. at 165 (statement of Paul W. Cook, Treasurer, National Association of Manufacturers).
103. Under the "ann's-length" system of taxation of foreign source income, abuse is rampant. See
supra note 81. As a U.S. Tteasury Department report put it, "very substantial tax benefits turn upon
an artificial factor: whether a foreign corporate charter has been interposed between foreign income
and the U.S. taxpayer." Hearing, State Taxation, supra note 80, at 100 (The President's 1978 Tax
Program, Department of the Treasury, submitted by the California Franchise Tax Board). Under the
current system, the small businessman by paying his sales tax, personal income tax, and property tax
could end up subsidizing the activities of a multi-jurisdictional corporation within his state, because
through the manipulation of the tax law, the large corporation may avoid its state tax responsibility.
A multi-jurisdicitonal business operates in a unitary manner, with the benefits of operations in a
particular locality being distributed throughout the corporate body. To allow such corporations to use
the tax law to compartmentalize liability on the basis of political boundaries and thus minimize their
responsibility is true unfairness.
104. Id. at 165.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. It is precisely as a result of the lower return on investment on domestic production that many
businesses invest overseas. The recent actions of the American electronics industry are instructive. In
1980, the U.S. had a $6.8 billion trade surplus on computers, consumer electronics, telecommunica-
tions equipment and microchips. By 1983, that surplus had shrunk to two billion dollars, and it is
expected that 1984 will produce no surplus at all. Much of this precipitous decline may be attributed
to "American companies setting up abroad-either to sell into local markets or to use low-cost labour
to assemble components for re-importing into America. Malaysia, for example, accounts for $1.1
billion of the value added in the $26.4 billion . . . world semiconducter market, but has no indige-
nous chipmaker." The Surprise Importer, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 1984, at 67.
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Finally, it is argued that as a result of using the unitary system and raising
corporate tax rates, significantly higher taxes for the multi-jurisdictional business
community would be inevitable. Higher taxes have a detrimental effect on corpo-
rate investment decision making. Thus, the negative net effect of the additional
taxes to the economy as a whole would offset the benefits accruing to the export
sector.
Examination of this objection proves it to be groundless. The institution of a
unitary tax and a higher rate of taxation will certainly mean more taxes for many
large corporations. Yet the overall tax bill of small corporations could well
decrease as a result of the unitary tax. 08 Personal and property tax burdens could
also be eased, because more state tax revenue would be paid by the large multi-
jurisdictional corporations. Since small businesses provide seven out of every ten
new jobs for American workers, 109 the effects of the increased tax on employ-
ment levels would be minimal. In fact, the only real "harm" that would occur as
a result of the institution of the unitary tax would be to the profits earned from
foreign operations by large multi-jurisdictional enterprises.
I1. THE FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION INCENTIVE AND THE STATE
UNITARY TAXATION DISINCENTIVE AS A POLICY PACKAGE.
In order for the new export policy to be effective, it is necessary that both the
unitary tax system disincentive and the FSC incentive be in place simultaneously.
Without the FSC incentive for investment in export production, the unitary
system of taxation will do nothing to encourage export activity. With only a
unitary system in place, corporate tax liability would increase, but the present
levels of return on export production would remain constant, at levels generally
below the return achieved on foreign investment. "0 Similarly, the benefits of
export incentives like the FSC or DISC are insufficient to equalize the return on
foreign and export production investment. "' Without the unitary system bringing
foreign and domestic investment return into rough parity, the full potential of the
FSC incentive would not be met.
108. Because the multi-jurisdictional corporation would be paying more in taxes under the unitary
system, strictly local business would have to bear less of the burden for funding state services.
Property taxes and small business tax rates could well be expected to decrease, once the larger
corporations pay their share. Thus, strictly local business generally supports the unitary system. New
Tax, supra note 78, at E9; see also Hearing, State Taxation, supra note 80, at 48 (testimony of James
B. Zagel, Director of Revenue, State of Illinois).
109. According to the Small Business Administration, fully 70 percent of all new jobs between
1978 and 1980 were generated by businesses with under 100 employees. U.S. SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, THE STATE OF SMALL BusiNEss: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 64 (1983).
110. The wage and tax rates of nations like Malaysia or Republic of Korea (South Korea) are far
below those of the United States, so low that the shipping costs associated with moving goods across
the Pacific Ocean when combined with the cost of labor and the producing nation's tax claims still
allow the producer to realize a greater profit than on a good manufactured in the U.S. These
difference would remain no matter what tax system is used. In order to increase exports, it is
necessary that the FSC incentive, or one like it, be in place as a counter to the structural advantages
found in foreign nations.
Ill. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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There are two basic assumptions underlying the proposed policy that uses a
combination of a FSC-style export incentive and the unitary tax system. The first
assumption is that business decision-makers are sensitive to changes in the tax
code and will try to divert capital into operations that will produce the highest
possible net return. The second is that the aggregate tax responsibility of the
corporate community will increase over the next several years.
The first assumption is supported by the DISC experience, which provides
evidence that manipulation of the tax code will in fact produce adjustments in
investment decisions by business. Taxes are part of the cost of producing goods,
and when the tax on a good is lowered, the producer will realize greater net
profits. Simple economic theory dictates that investment capital will gravitate
towards the sector of the economy that offers the highest return. It therefore
seems fair to assume that business will tailor investment to respond to changes in
the tax code.
As to the second assumption, while there may be no real prospect of signifi-
cantly higher federal taxes, aggregate corporate tax bills may still be expected to
increase as a result of higher state taxes. "2 Higher taxes could create an effective
disincentive to foreign investment by equalizing the after-tax return between
domestic and foreign investment through the system of progressive taxation. "3
Simply put, the greater the tax responsibility, the greater the propensity of corpo-
rations to use tax incentives.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order to increase export activity, it is necessary to increase the profits
realized from exporting while decreasing the profits made by direct foreign
investment. The most effective means to these ends, absent significant govern-
mental intervention, lie in manipulation of the tax code. A new export policy
should rely on the proposed Foreign Sales Corporation as an export tax incentive,
and on the implementation by the state of the unitary tax as a disincentive to
direct foreign investment. The FSC and the unitary tax system, the incentive and
the disincentive, are most effective when used in concert. Adopting the FSC-
unitary tax package will produce greater U.S. export activity, higher investment
in the domestic economy, and more jobs for American workers.
112. See supra note 94.
113. By taxing large profits at a higher rate, the amount of net return on highly profitable foreign
investments will be brought into a greater equality with domestic investment, due to the progressive
nature of the income tax system. The more money made, the more lost to taxes.
Given the FSC incentive, the net return of domestic investment therefore, exceeds the net return of
an equal foreign investment. Because the rational investor operates on the basis of net return, he will
invest in the U.S. economy under conditions like those outlined above. See supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
